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Washington and New Delhi had long enjoyed what was widely considered one of the most flourishing and successful strategic partnerships of the post–Cold War period. Now, for the first time in years, the relationship between the world’s largest democracy and the only remaining superpower is in one of its most difficult phases as trust between the two countries gives way to tariffs, oil, and spheres of influence.

“We’re in a situation in the U.S.-India relationship where the premises and assumptions of the last 25 years — that everybody worked very hard to build, including the president in his first term — have just come completely unraveled. The trust is gone,” Evan Feigenbaum, South Asia chair at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said bluntly.

The issue came to a head after President Donald Trump imposed broad tariffs on Indian goods this year following New Delhi’s continued purchases of Russian crude oil despite the war in Ukraine. The tariff initially applied a 25 percent levy that is set to double to 50 percent on August 27. Rather than change its oil buying practices, the U.S. action appears to have pushed the Indian government closer to Russia and, by extension, China.

In the past few weeks, India’s national security adviser visited Moscow, Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar held talks there, and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi wrapped up talks in New Delhi. Prime Minister Narendra Modi is also planning his first trip to China in over seven years and could be hosting Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow before the end of the year. Analysts say the outreach is more than just symbolic.

Indian public sentiment has also turned against what it sees as U.S. meddling in sovereign economic matters. “They’re signaling very clearly that they view that as interference in India’s foreign policy, and they are not going to put up with it,” Feigenbaum said.

After initial reluctance at the start of the war, state-run refiners resumed their Russian oil imports after being offered discounts of six to seven percent. The consequence has been startling: Russian oil now makes up 35 percent of India’s total crude imports compared to only 0.2 percent before the Ukraine conflict. Moscow is now eager to raise its offer. “We will continue shipping crude, oil products, thermal, and coking coal. There is also potential for the export of Russian LNG,” Russian Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov said.

Questions of Trust and Domestic Politics

Michael Kugelman, a South Asia analyst at the Washington-based Wilson Center, said Trump’s tariffs have not been the only reason for India recalibrating its ties with the United States, though. “We’ve seen indications for almost a year of India wanting to ease tensions with China and strengthen relations, mainly for economic reasons. But the Trump administration’s policies have made India want to move even more quickly,” he said.

Kugelman said some of New Delhi’s moves might be “performance art to some degree,” but others are likely to be far more permanent. “India is going to double down on some aspects of its economic and defense relationship with Russia — and those parts are not performative,” Feigenbaum added.

India had already been pivoting away from Russian arms before the Ukraine war, buying U.S., French, and Israeli equipment to go with its traditional Russian purchases. However, once the invasion began, India’s energy trade with Moscow exploded. “The takeaway for India has been that it was probably correct in its assessment that the U.S. can’t be trusted, whereas Russia can — because Russia is always going to be there for India no matter what,” Kugelman said.

Modi has played the moment at home as a strongman defending Indian sovereignty. He has also been emphasizing his singular focus on the well-being of farmers, small businesses, and India’s young workforce — all talking points with strong domestic political currency. “India had already made significant concessions on issues like tariffs and returning migrant workers. Because of those concessions, India needs to be careful about signaling further willingness to bend. This is one reason there was no trade deal — Modi put his foot down,” Kugelman said.

For its part, Washington has been digging in its heels. In an opinion article in the Financial Times, former White House trade adviser Peter Navarro called India’s purchases of Russian oil “opportunistic” and “deeply corrosive.” He wrote that tariffs were needed to punish India “where it hurts — its access to U.S. markets — even as it seeks to cut off the financial lifeline it has extended to Russia’s war effort.”

Signs of Divergence

The current drift in relations between the two countries would have been unthinkable after the high-water mark of the 2008 U.S.-India civil nuclear deal, which allowed India access to American fuel and technology despite its non-NPT status. At the time, both countries were able to compartmentalize their differences and prevent them from spilling over into other parts of the partnership.

That has now changed. The United States had for a long time seen India as its democratic counterweight to China in its Indo-Pacific strategy that was pursued by successive U.S. administrations under Barack Obama, Trump, and Joe Biden. However, as tensions over trade and oil are now beginning to seep into defense and intelligence cooperation, that equation now looks to be changing.

“The glue that was binding this relationship in terms of the strategic aspect was countering China. And if the U.S.-India relationship continues this free fall, it will be very difficult to sustain,” Kugelman said.

Feigenbaum noted the irony in the dynamic between the countries. “Then, India was leveraging its partnership to signal to then-foe China that it had options. Now they’re working with the Chinese to signal Washington rather than the other way around,” he said.

The message from India is clear: It will not be bullied by anyone into following America’s lead.